David Kilcullen, adviser on counterinsurgency to General Petraeus and the author
of The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford University Press, 2009), talks about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and his op-ed against the use of drones in yesterday's New York Times.
Comments [9]
Re: you have to bring in more than just troops.
There's a school of thought that one big reason the English settlements at Plymouth and Jamestown survived is that they brought women/families.
Indians considered them less of a military threat.
Not that we'd bring families to Kandahar(!), but there are other ways, as Kilcullen mentioned, to appear less of a threat, a military occupying force, to local residents.
I hope Kilcullen's views are making their way to Obama/Petraeus.
Hi,
It was very good to hear Mr. Kilcullen talk on issues never heard before from a western individual. He also clarified many important things as well where if a Muslim person would have said it, it wouldn’t have the same impact. For an outsider to look deep into matters important to that region of the world and understand the theory and be open minded - is very refreshing and gives all of us who are from that part of the world that we are all not the same and that we love peace and reject the ideology of extremist. We live and let live in peace.
Best regards,
Aysha
But in Sri Lanka, that shrinking area controlled by the Tamil Tigers also had thousands of civilians being used as human shields. The Tigers killed those who tried to leave, & the government still shelled the area, & many civilians were killed by both sides.
Your a great man David. I thank you for helping Patreaus and America change the policies of Rumsfeld when it comes to waging war. Your insights altered the course of these two wars for the better. It proves that applying intelligence and common sense leads to progress.
Thank You.
What would a partnership look like with the society on the Afghan/Pakistan border because, as your guest stated, tribal structure has eroded to the point where there is little leadership or trust.
In other words, if there is district-wide, societal-building anti-insurgency, how does this work or look on-the-ground? (Many hyphens...)
I disagree with a unerlying view of your guest. He does not take into account the close cultural, religious and familial ties the people in Pakistan have with some questionable characters in the area. When there was a treaty with the governments, did the Pakistani Taliban look at it as weakness to be exploited or comprimise on which to base a future?
what do you think canada should do? plaisr
Some observations: progress in Afghanistan depends on the actions of the Pakistani government. The Pakistani government's course of action ultimately depends on popular opinion in Pakistan. That is, if the Pakistani people believe that the Taliban is the greatest threat, then the government will tend towards sustained action to rein in the Taliban. But if the people are not so convinced, as is now the case, then the government tend to laying off the Taliban.
Given these conditions, why have we not set a priority on convincing the Pakistani PEOPLE that the Taliban is their greatest threat? As Dr. Kilcullen points out, the drone attacks do more damage in convincing the people otherwise than the good they do in eliminating individual al Qaeda agent.
Hm, don't get it, using drones in yesterday's NYTimes!!?
Strange
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